I work on these and other 737's and until these tragic events occurred I did not know this system even existed. We do not check/repair/or inspect any part of the MCAS system as part of my daily job requirements. Boeing did not feel it necessary to include it in the 2 weeks differences class I had to attend. So it makes me wonder how effective they educated the pilots on the system.
It also astounds me that this critical system that has the ability to take control of the pitch of the airplane only relied on one AOA sensor. Redundancy is the mantra in commercial airliners. EVERY system has backups or gains info from more than one input. So fixing the software to compare both AOA sensors should be an easy fix. Dave, is allowing the electric trim to override the MCAS command part of the fix? Having to disconnect both A/P and electric trim switches removes any way for the pilots to trim the plane at higher speeds.
I expect this to take longer than necessary to get these planes back in the air since the FAA was caught with their pants down on how they oversaw the development of the Max. Now it will be overkill on the approval process to make these changes.
It also astounds me that this critical system that has the ability to take control of the pitch of the airplane only relied on one AOA sensor. Redundancy is the mantra in commercial airliners. EVERY system has backups or gains info from more than one input. So fixing the software to compare both AOA sensors should be an easy fix. Dave, is allowing the electric trim to override the MCAS command part of the fix? Having to disconnect both A/P and electric trim switches removes any way for the pilots to trim the plane at higher speeds.
I expect this to take longer than necessary to get these planes back in the air since the FAA was caught with their pants down on how they oversaw the development of the Max. Now it will be overkill on the approval process to make these changes.