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Ok so we all know of the two aircraft crashes. While the latest determination is not 100% it is believed that the causes were likely due to sensor malfunctions (incorrect readings) which triggered the MCAS system to force the noise of the planes down.
For those not too familiar with the information about the plane or the system let me touch on just what its about. (as I understand it)
And so the 737 had some redesign a few years back which is why it was called the max8 as that in itself is the redesign model of the 737. The redesign included an engine upgrade. The larger more efficient engines under the wings would have been too close to the ground if simply placed where the old engines were. So Boeing moved them forward just enough in front of the wings in order to raise them up and maintain ground clearance. Because of this new engine placement it is said the aircraft in "certain situations" may have tendency to want to pitch the "nose-up". And if the plane noses up too much it can possibly risk stall. That part would be true of most any commercial jetliner not just the max8 but the others wouldn't have possible tendency to nose-up and there in lies a difference due to the new engine placement. One those situations where this could happen would be when in climb after take off.
Stall (to clarify) doesn't mean engine failure but means (aerodynamic stall) inability to maintain lift via the wings. Its an air stall, not an engine stall. Basically....no lift, no fly.
Ok so, in light of this possibility to nose up , Boeing installed and MCAS system to prevent this. The system utilized "angle of attack" sensors on the nose of the aircraft and if they indicated too much pitch coming too close to stall angle the MCAS system would automatically engage to turn the aircraft nose down. Of course not down towards the ground but simply down enough from its higher pitch so that stall would not occur and lift would be maintained.
It is believed the MCAS system actually did the jobs it was suppose to do. But it is believed it did so based on false and/or crossed up sensor readings. basically the sensors failed, not technically the MCAS. And so with false input from the sensors the MCAS consistently tries to nose down thinking its too high when it actually wasn't. This created a battle between pilots and computer and causing nosing up and down of the aircrafts (perhaps roller coasting for lack of a better term). And unfortunately the computer won the battle but of course lost the war as disaster was the end result.
All it would have taken was a simple button to push to disengage the system and the pilots would have taken over. We can talk probably forever about pilot training. And whether the airline companies hold some blame for that lack of training about the system and what to do in an emergency or whether it was more Boeing who could have insisted on the training. From what ive gathered there was also a couple other optional indirectly related installed things that would have likely prevented this which some airlines purchased with the aircraft and others didn't. Those debates can go on for ever.
before I get into what has me bothered let me say that airliners nowadays are far more computerized than most people even come close to thinking. The modern liners today basically fly themselves. Airbus actually utilizes more computer controlled flight from take off through arrival than Boeing does. Boeing believes a bit more in pilot input while Airbus uses a bit more automation. But planes can and do even land themselves in blind visibility. Like it or not, things are just simply that automated today. There is certainly an uneasy feeling about that imo. But its also known that human error (in the past) was the majority cause of disasters. So which way is best? or has it now gone too far the other way? I don't really know and is a whole other worthy discussion in itself.
But as for what got me questioning whether this aircraft should even been flying is this. I keep getting stuck on this.
If a plane (due to a redesign) now had a tendency to pitch up in certain circumstances (like after take off) and might do so enough so that an air stall might become an issue, and enough that it required a system (MCAS) to combat it, then how the heck is that considered air worthy? That part really bothers me. This is not a scenario where lets say an engine was lost and now a computer helps right the plane considering one side now has drag and dead weight while the other side has thrust. Or any other failed scenario where a special (or emergency type) circumstance appeared. This imo is instead a flaw in flight design in itself. I mean if in a climb with nose up and the plane itself (by its own physical flying characteristics) has potential to nose itself up too much where risk of stall becomes a concern, then how in the world is that considered air worthy for use by commercial flight? Remember this isn't military but this is commercial. Two different purposes there.
Contrary to what it is that is bothering me I would actually trust the software and if any hardware fix they come up with to prevent this from happening again. And the sensors and the MCAS system would also help if pilot error raised the planes nose too high an angle too. But Im still stuck on the fact that (to me) we shouldn't really commercially be flying in planes that have tendency (via its very own physical flying design) to do anything that puts air stall at risk or anything at risk. Imo the plane aerodynamics in itself shouldnt have tendency to do anything outside of pilot input that would require corrective fixes. Not unless there was loss of engine or damage to aircraft, etc... Those are things that need to be corrected when they should ever happen. But to implant a system to address an aerodynamic flying flaw in itself just seems wrong to me even if its a trustworthy fix.
That just doesn't make sense. Boeing in all its great and glorious air history I feel made a bad choice here. They needed (at the time) to compete in that one specific type and size mid range airliner class with a plane that Airbus put out and Boeing was behind and pressed. The only way to a solution was to modify the 737 (hence the max 8). There is only so much you can do when modifying because once too many things are done it is now considered a new airplane. Its tweaking instead of reinventing. And once reinvented its longer the same aircraft and requires new or redesigned facility to build the new design and also needs new complete certification. That is a lot of money and years to take place. So the answer was to modify and its not like this hasn't been done in the past. That's why there are several versions of many planes with the same model numbers. I cant even say how many versions of the 747 there were/are but its a whole lot. The 737 is no exception. There were/are numerous versions. But this one time.....the modification seems to me (because of this flight flaw) which required something to specifically combat the flaw issue perhaps shouldn't have been allowed.
For those not too familiar with the information about the plane or the system let me touch on just what its about. (as I understand it)
And so the 737 had some redesign a few years back which is why it was called the max8 as that in itself is the redesign model of the 737. The redesign included an engine upgrade. The larger more efficient engines under the wings would have been too close to the ground if simply placed where the old engines were. So Boeing moved them forward just enough in front of the wings in order to raise them up and maintain ground clearance. Because of this new engine placement it is said the aircraft in "certain situations" may have tendency to want to pitch the "nose-up". And if the plane noses up too much it can possibly risk stall. That part would be true of most any commercial jetliner not just the max8 but the others wouldn't have possible tendency to nose-up and there in lies a difference due to the new engine placement. One those situations where this could happen would be when in climb after take off.
Stall (to clarify) doesn't mean engine failure but means (aerodynamic stall) inability to maintain lift via the wings. Its an air stall, not an engine stall. Basically....no lift, no fly.
Ok so, in light of this possibility to nose up , Boeing installed and MCAS system to prevent this. The system utilized "angle of attack" sensors on the nose of the aircraft and if they indicated too much pitch coming too close to stall angle the MCAS system would automatically engage to turn the aircraft nose down. Of course not down towards the ground but simply down enough from its higher pitch so that stall would not occur and lift would be maintained.
It is believed the MCAS system actually did the jobs it was suppose to do. But it is believed it did so based on false and/or crossed up sensor readings. basically the sensors failed, not technically the MCAS. And so with false input from the sensors the MCAS consistently tries to nose down thinking its too high when it actually wasn't. This created a battle between pilots and computer and causing nosing up and down of the aircrafts (perhaps roller coasting for lack of a better term). And unfortunately the computer won the battle but of course lost the war as disaster was the end result.
All it would have taken was a simple button to push to disengage the system and the pilots would have taken over. We can talk probably forever about pilot training. And whether the airline companies hold some blame for that lack of training about the system and what to do in an emergency or whether it was more Boeing who could have insisted on the training. From what ive gathered there was also a couple other optional indirectly related installed things that would have likely prevented this which some airlines purchased with the aircraft and others didn't. Those debates can go on for ever.
before I get into what has me bothered let me say that airliners nowadays are far more computerized than most people even come close to thinking. The modern liners today basically fly themselves. Airbus actually utilizes more computer controlled flight from take off through arrival than Boeing does. Boeing believes a bit more in pilot input while Airbus uses a bit more automation. But planes can and do even land themselves in blind visibility. Like it or not, things are just simply that automated today. There is certainly an uneasy feeling about that imo. But its also known that human error (in the past) was the majority cause of disasters. So which way is best? or has it now gone too far the other way? I don't really know and is a whole other worthy discussion in itself.
But as for what got me questioning whether this aircraft should even been flying is this. I keep getting stuck on this.
If a plane (due to a redesign) now had a tendency to pitch up in certain circumstances (like after take off) and might do so enough so that an air stall might become an issue, and enough that it required a system (MCAS) to combat it, then how the heck is that considered air worthy? That part really bothers me. This is not a scenario where lets say an engine was lost and now a computer helps right the plane considering one side now has drag and dead weight while the other side has thrust. Or any other failed scenario where a special (or emergency type) circumstance appeared. This imo is instead a flaw in flight design in itself. I mean if in a climb with nose up and the plane itself (by its own physical flying characteristics) has potential to nose itself up too much where risk of stall becomes a concern, then how in the world is that considered air worthy for use by commercial flight? Remember this isn't military but this is commercial. Two different purposes there.
Contrary to what it is that is bothering me I would actually trust the software and if any hardware fix they come up with to prevent this from happening again. And the sensors and the MCAS system would also help if pilot error raised the planes nose too high an angle too. But Im still stuck on the fact that (to me) we shouldn't really commercially be flying in planes that have tendency (via its very own physical flying design) to do anything that puts air stall at risk or anything at risk. Imo the plane aerodynamics in itself shouldnt have tendency to do anything outside of pilot input that would require corrective fixes. Not unless there was loss of engine or damage to aircraft, etc... Those are things that need to be corrected when they should ever happen. But to implant a system to address an aerodynamic flying flaw in itself just seems wrong to me even if its a trustworthy fix.
That just doesn't make sense. Boeing in all its great and glorious air history I feel made a bad choice here. They needed (at the time) to compete in that one specific type and size mid range airliner class with a plane that Airbus put out and Boeing was behind and pressed. The only way to a solution was to modify the 737 (hence the max 8). There is only so much you can do when modifying because once too many things are done it is now considered a new airplane. Its tweaking instead of reinventing. And once reinvented its longer the same aircraft and requires new or redesigned facility to build the new design and also needs new complete certification. That is a lot of money and years to take place. So the answer was to modify and its not like this hasn't been done in the past. That's why there are several versions of many planes with the same model numbers. I cant even say how many versions of the 747 there were/are but its a whole lot. The 737 is no exception. There were/are numerous versions. But this one time.....the modification seems to me (because of this flight flaw) which required something to specifically combat the flaw issue perhaps shouldn't have been allowed.